The question, why did the United States attack, invade and occupy Iraq in 2003, remains unanswered. Even stranger, is why the international coalition of 1990-91 did not march into Baghdad when Sadam was a real threat, and most of the world stood united against him.

One could call the years 1990-91 as magical years, the Cold War had ended and the world faced new opportunities to develop greater understanding, peace, and stability. Filled with optimism, at that time I wrote in a travel publication: "We are entering a golden age of travel." It was difficult to imagine we were entering a new age of conflict.

On July 15 1990, Sadam Hussein accused Kuwait of stealing oil from Rumaylah oil field and set the stage for the invasion of Kuwait. Two weeks later, the Iraqi Army invaded the Emirate, causing world wide condemnation.

Within days, the UN declared an oil embargo, the US Navy established a blockade and a military coalition began to form. On August 9, first American forces arrived in Saudi Arabia, ensuring US involvement should Sadam invade the desert kingdom.

As US military forces gathered everything pointed toward a military campaign in the cooler months of winter. The Iraqi army one of the largest armies in the world, well equipped, and battle seasoned seemed a formidable foe.

By September British and French forces joined the coalition plus numerous smaller contingents from other countries. The total number of troops would grow to over half a million. To deploy this number of troops and keep them supplied, the US once more showed it's awesome logistical capability.

The Soviet Union tried to mediate a peace but refused to aid it's client state.

Sadam predicted a Jihad and promised the Arab world the Mother of all Battles, in which he would defeat the infidel armies massing on the Kuwait border. He even went as far as declaring the annexation of Kuwait, making it Iraq's 19^th province and re-naming Kuwait City al Kadhima.

Had these events happened just a few years earlier we would have been faced with either a stalemate or World War III. But for once the world stood united and in various degrees condemned Sadam Hussein's actions.

Even when war seemed inevitable, diplomatic efforts to avoid it continued. Alas, by January 9 1991, talks between US Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tarik Asiz ended in stalemate.

Three days later the US Congress granted President Bush Sr. authority to wage war.

On January 17 the air campaign of Operation Desert Storm began with the bombing of Baghdad. This lasted a little over one month, but Sadam remained defiant. Huge minefields, large numbers of entrenched armored vehicles and masses of artillery facing coalition forces, promised a hard land-campaign ahead.

On February 24, coalition forces crossed the border. One hundred hours later the Iraqi army was defeated.

A Defense Department report to Congress cites 3847 tanks destroyed. 1450 armored personnel carriers destroyed. 86,000 Iraqi prisoners taken. This report also states: This was the most complete victory in military history.

Considering the extent of the victory and the ease with which it was achieved; the question remains why didn't the victorious coalition forces drive on to Baghdad?

Sadam's army was incapable and unwilling to fight, the Shias in the south rose in rebellion. World opinion was behind President Bush. Yet coalition forces, after reaching the Euphrates river began to withdraw.

In the Defense Department's report to congress one finds a small hint under Shortcomings: Had the operation lasted longer, maneuver forces would have outrun their fuel and other support.

Of course every junior officer knows that when advancing, one must stop and allow supplies to catch up. Troops must rest. The coalition army at the banks of the Euphrates was in perfect position to re-supply and then dash to Baghdad.

What has been kept as a closely guarded secret is that Desert Storm was almost scrapped completely in mid January. To be able to complete Desert Storm, the air campaign had to be considerably shortened and the date to launch the ground war advanced.

Had Sadam known what forced General Schwartzkopf to attack when he did, his defensive tactics might have been different and the outcome of Desert Storm a disaster to the coalition.

The moment the fighting stopped, there was a massive airlift of troops out of the Gulf area. This had to be done because American troops were threatened by starvation.

The well kept secret is that the MRE (meals ready to eat) stored in two ships anchored in the gulf spoiled. I don't know the exact tonnage of rotten meals, but a conservative estimate would be around 30,000 tons. That is 120,000,000 meals. When the air campaign began, Coalition forces had less than a 30 day supply of rations. American suppliers were unable to meet the sudden demand created by this massive loss.

Why was it kept such a secret? Perhaps it reveals a weakness of the massive Pentagon bureaucratic machine in adapting to the vagaries of war, or could we call them spoils in this instance?

That American troops would be threatened with starvation.

Copyright © 2004 Alex Braguine, All Rights Reserved.